NATO's Summit of Submission and Hollowness
An assessment of the 2025 Hague Summit
Over the years, I have been involved in close to 20 NATO summits. Many of them had a substantive political agenda, like the 2022 Madrid Summit with NATO adopting a new Strategic Concept. Some were dramatic, like the 2018 Brussels Summit when then President Trump’s closely averted intention to leave the Alliance led to a “near death experience” of NATO. The 2025 Summit in The Hague was a particularly low point in NATO’s summit history, characterized by European submission and strategic hollowness.
The Summit’s key leitmotiv, impersonated in particular by NATO Secretary General Rutte, was “Trump appeasement”. The focus on the new defence spending plan as the Summit’s dominating topic served to fabricate a “Trump victory”. It allowed Allies and Secretary Rutte to underline that the agreement on 5% GDP defence investment is the achievement of Donald Trump, and it allowed Donald Trump to claim just that.
Europeans and Canada will point out that this tactic worked: There were no surprise clashes. Donald Trump did not leave the Summit in anticipation, unlike to what happened just before at the G7 meeting. The Hague Summit Declaration reaffirms Allies’ commitment to collective defence, as enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty – at least on paper.
For Donald Trump this is secondary. On his way to the Summit, he again casted doubt on the US’ commitment to NATO’s article 5. He pointed out that Allies should adhere to the new defence spending benchmark – except for the US. And on his way back from the Summit, the White House published a video clip on “Daddy’s home”, applying Marc Rutte’s reference to Trump’s role as “daddy” in the Israel-Iran conflict to NATO, and ridiculing Europeans for their subservience. Bottom line: Donald Trump concluded that as a strongman he can continue to bully Europeans and treat them as minions.
This is primarily Europe’s and Canada’s self-inflicted misery. To buy Trump’s goodwill, the Summit avoided at least three broader strategic issues:
It excluded the existential issues of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the question how a Ukrainian victory could be achieved;
It avoided any discussion on Russia and the still lacking strategy to contain Russia at a time when Putin intensifies his shadow war against Allies;
And it omitted to outline a coherent plan on how Europeans and Canada could take on more strategic responsibility for their security and defence.
In 2019, President Macron described NATO as ‘brain dead’ – causing much outrage at the time. If he were to repeat this today, there would probably be more agreement.
US disengaging from Europe - quicker than you may think
In any case, if Europe and Canada believe that with pledging 5% GDP on defence spending, they are off the hook, this is at best naïve. While the exact scope and speed of US disengagement from Europe is still unclear, the direction of travel is evident:
As US Ambassador to NATO Whitaker recently confirmed, conversations about troop reduction this will start directly after the NATO Summit in The Hague.
The Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance recently issued by US Defence Minister Hegseth and leaked to US media underlines that “China is the Department’s sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan – while simultaneously defending the US homeland is the Department’s sole pacing scenario.”
When it comes to Europe, the leaked Interim National Strategic Guidance from the Pentagon suggests that the US would support Europe with nuclear deterrence of Russia, but is “unlikely to provide any substantial, if any, support to Europe in the case of Russian military advances.” Vladimir Putin will have taken good note of this formulation, which incidentally also undermines NATO’s Article 5. The Guidance also notes that Washington intends to push NATO allies to take primary defence of the region.
This direction of reduced US engagement in Europe is confirmed in a memo from Hegseth to Pentagon leaders launching the “Army Transformation Initiative” – which some insiders consider as “disarmament” when it comes to US presence in Europe. And it asks for the results in 2027 – matching the date when US believes that China aims to have the capabilities to seize Taiwan.
Europeans would face significant challenges if the US would e.g. pull out one of the two armoured brigades, or one of the two combat aviation brigades - as heavy brigades and combat aviation are among Europe’s significant gaps.
Altogether, this confirms that Europeans need to act now to become more credible and capable actors for their defence and security.
The new defence investment plan - or paper is patient
A commitment to now 5% GDP for defence spending is useful, but it is no substitute for a coherent plan for greater European strategic responsibility. In fact, when it comes to defence procurement, European dependence on the US has risen over past years. According to recent data from SIPRI, European arms procurement from the US from 2020 to 2024 amounts to 64% – an increase from 52% over the period from 2015 to 2019.
The language in the Hague Summit Declaration is, in comparison to the 2024 Wales pledge somewhat firmer (“Allies commit to invest 5% of GDP”). However, like everything in NATO this is not enforceable, and therefore largely depends on the enduring good will of Allies. Some of them will proceed including Poland, the Baltics, and as a newcomer in this group also Germany, while other will lag behind or find ways to wiggle out. As a case in point, Spain, Slovakia, and also the US already made it clear that they do not feel bound by this provision.
While the 3,5% GDP portion of the defence investment is derived from NATO agreed higher capability targets and will be based on the agreed definition of NATO defence expenditure, the 1,5% GDP of defence and security related investments will lead to a lot of creative accounting – including old civil infrastructure projects like a bridge to Sicily.
Most importantly: Numbers on paper do not win military conflicts; that requires troops and the right capabilities. Higher defence spending does not automatically result in higher defence capabilities. If the defence industry simply raises prices, nations get less equipment for the same money. So, what is also needed is an increase in production, more joint orders from Europeans, healthy competition and, above all, more European innovation in the defence sector. The EU and its various initiatives in the security and defence sector must play a key role to create a single European defence market.
Furthermore, the agreed deadline to raise defence spending to 5% GDP by 2035 is far too late. According to recent research from Center for Strategic and International studies (CSIS) the number of Russian attacks nearly tripled between 2023 and 2024 in Europe with operations targeting transport, government, critical infrastructure, and industry.
As Europeans we must realise that we now longer live in peace but under Russia’s intensifying shadow war. We need more sense of urgency and face hard realities: The world is not a large petting zoo. In the world created by Trump, Putin and Xi, the law of the jungle prevails. If Europeans do not want to be eaten, they must stick together, and be strong and courageous.
At least there is one positive aspect of the Summit Declaration: It links defence spending with Ukraine as Allies “will include direct contributions towards Ukraine’s defence and its defence industry when calculating Allies’ defence spending.” In practice this means that nations refilling gaps in national equipment given to Ukraine counts against the 3,5% benchmark, and providing new supplies to Ukraine counts against the 1,5% benchmark.
Ukraine sidelined - a shameful irresponsibility
In relation to Ukraine and Russia’s war of aggression against it, the Hague Summit was a sobering testimony of Allied strategic irresponsibility, and yet another expression of European submission. In contrast to previous NATO Summits, Ukraine was marginalised. President Zelenskyy only attended the dinner with Heads of State and Government. The only formal meeting in the Summit programme at the level of Heads of State and Government excluded Ukraine.
Accordingly, the language in the Hague Summit Declaration is very weak: There is no reference to Ukraine's irreversible path to NATO membership, no reference to previous summit decisions, no reference to Ukraine as a strategic centre for European security, let alone any agreed way forward on how to enable Ukraine’s victory.
As such, the Summit was a particularly low point in the sad trajectory of strategic failure on the part of Ukraine's partners: For over three years, they have given Ukraine just enough to survive and stay in the fight, but too little, too late, and with too many caveats to win the war on its own terms. The tactic to avoid escalation with Russia which started under US President Biden and had followers in e.g. German Chancellor Scholz, combined with the inability of Allies to devise a coherent Russia-containment strategy is emboldening Vladimir Putin – to intensify his war against Ukraine, and his aggressions against Allies. With Donald Trump cosying up with him, recently withholding the delivery of already agreed air defence missiles, including Patriot components, to Ukraine, Putin will be even more determined to pursue his revanchist agenda. As President Zelenskyy underlined in The Hague, Putin needs the war to stay in power.
In view of Donald Trump’s U-turn away from agreed NATO policies, when it comes to Ukraine NATO can only use existing tools and mechanisms like the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) Ukraine or the NATO Security Assistance and Training to Ukraine (NSATU), but cannot come up with new policies or new initiatives. For that to happen, it must either be generated via coalitions of the willing or via other fora, in particular the EU. An important step in the right direction is the “Porcupine Strategy” for Ukraine outlined in the EU Commission’s recent White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030: By enhancing Ukraine’s defence and security capacity, Ukraine will be enabled to deter attacks and ensure a lasting peace.
Europeans could exert pressure on the US if they wanted. They could easily make offers to purchase US weapons on the condition that the US also sells weapons to Ukraine. This could be a very effective tactic – but it means they would have to be bold and determined vis-à-vis the US. Minions living in submission do not do such things.